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I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Reserve has been criticized for not forestalling the financial crisis of 2007-09, and for its unconventional monetary policies that have followed. External measures, however, have been limited. It is concluded that the absence of fully 1 On Federal Reserve policies during the crisis, see Bernanke, 2012 . For a critique of Federal Reserve monetary and regulatory policies leading to the crisis, see Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, 2011, pp. xvi, xvii. The Report finds that the housing bubble that precipitated the crisis was "fueled by low interest rates, easy and available credit, scant regulation, and toxic mortgages...." The Report notes "...the Federal Reserve's pivotal failure to stem the flow of toxic mortgages...." For a critique of Federal Reserve merger policy that over the previous 25 years had augmented the size of banking companies that proved "too-big-to-fail," see Shull, 2010 . A number of economists have questioned the Fed's policies since the crisis in the public press, criticizing "centralized control by a few government officials." See Schultz, Boskin, Cogan, Meltzer and Taylor, 2012 , p. A19. See also, Cochrane, 2012 , p. A13, and Bhide and Phelps, 2013 effective governance poses a threat, not simply to "stakeholders," but to the independence of the Federal Reserve itself.
II. GOVERNANCE
Modern analysis of governance, particularly as applicable to corporations, developed over the past several decades. 2 However, the conditions motivating governance have existed at least since the advent of the modern corporation that separated ownership from control. Today, governance mechanisms are deemed necessary for almost all large organizations to check the unlawful, opportunistic and otherwise misguided conduct of managers ("agents") that affect the welfare of those who have little if any influence over their policies and behavior ("stakeholders").
For private corporations, internal governance may reside internally in formal lines of authority, and in boards of directors; it includes external mechanisms and procedures, such as outside audits and, also, competitive markets for capital and control. Such mechanisms typically provide for some degree of transparency and accountability, often to an impartial governing body. It is generally recognized that governance constitutes an essential foundation for legitimacy. Shull, August, 1971 , pp. 33ff. 30 Federal Reserve Board, 1924 . With the major countries in the world off the gold standard, Adolph Miller also told the Joint Conference of Governors and Chairmen in 1921 that the gold reserve ratio was "almost worse than useless as a guide to changes in discount rates." Miller 1921, p. 14. 31 Congress continued to give credence to checks-and-balances governance. In June 1922, it amended Section 10 of the Federal Reserve Act to increase the number of Board members from five to six in order to add a representative of agricultural interests to those already mentioned in the law. Conflict within the System continued through the decade with policy variations among Reserve Banks, and between Reserve Banks and the Board. The Board's influence on the Banks through the public members on their boards and, in particular, through the Chairman/Federal Reserve Agent was, it appears, largely frustrated (Bopp, 1935, pp. 11, 38, 46 ff.) . 32 Stabilization, Part 1 and 2, 1927 and Stabilization, 1928. The Senate bill in 1913 had contained a provision instructing the Federal Reserve to "promote stability in the price level" that, according to John R. Commons, George Shibley, a businessman and economics writer, had persuaded Senator Owen to insert [Commons, 1963 [Commons, (1934 . The provision was eliminated in conference (Willis, 1985 (Willis, 1923 (Willis, , pp. 1605 Fisher,1928, pp. 225-26 See Fisher,1934 and Commons 1925, p. 51. 34 See National Bank Act, Report, 1926, p.14.
Restructuring in the Great Depression
In the wake of the System's futility in the early 1930s, both economists and bankers made serious proposals to do away with privately-owned Reserve Banks. 35 Eccles, newly appointed to the Board, was prepared to undertake a significant reorganization. In a memorandum to the President, Eccles had asserted that the System failed because (1) "the diffusion of power and responsibility" can result in "a complete stalemate;" and (2) (Kennedy, 1973, pp. 166-67) . The Economic Policy Commission of the American Bankers Association proposed Reserve Banks be converted to branches of the Board (Burns, 1974, p. 82) . 36 The first Glass-Steagall Act in February 1932 and the Emergency Relief and Construction Act in July expanded the Federal Reserve's capacities to extend credit through open market operations and at the discount window. 37 Among other things, the Banking Act of 1933 gave the Board authority to raise reserve requirements in emergencies and the sole authority over bank holding companies. It raised the salaries of Board members and lengthened their terms of office from 10 to 12 years. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 gave the Board authority to establish margin requirements. 38 Eccles, 1934 . 39 Eccles, 1934 and Eccles, 1951, p. 166, 187. 40 See, Ickes, Vol. 1, 1953, pp. 108-09; and Schlesinger, Jr., 1959, p. 248 . During the hearings on the 1935 Act Roosevelt responded (off the record) to a reporter's question about the possible government purchase of Reserve Bank stock by recalling that during the fight between Jackson and Biddle an advisor had suggested the government obtain a majority interest in the Second Bank. He observed "that...would have solved the banking situation...in a much more satisfactory way...during the next ten years..." A reporter then asked, did you say "next" or "last ten years." Roosevelt is reported to have joined in the laughter (Blum, 1959, p. 349 (Bopp, 1935, p. 12) . 42 Blum, 1959, pp. 346-49. 43 In addition to Blum, op. cit, see Banking Act of 1935, "Hearings," pp. 312-14; and Ickes, Vol. I, 1953, pp. 534-35. 44 As quoted in Westerfield, 1933, pp. 727-28 45 The titles of System officials and their terms in office were changed to emphasize the shift in authority from the Reserve Banks to the Board. (1) 
IV. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: DODD-FRANK MODIFICATIONS
The restoration of relative interest rate and price stability after the early 1980s ushered in a period of sufficiently lowered volatility to be termed, by some economists, "the Great See Friedman, February 1982 . 53 Friedman, February 1982 , pp. 103, 114. 54 Friedman, February, 1982 . For his earlier proposal for a "rule," see Friedman, 1962, pp. 242-43 . 55 Bernanke has argued that improvements in monetary policy over that in the 1960s and 1970s was a principal underlying cause. See, Bernanke, 2004. 56 The intensity of the criticism is manifest in Havrilesky, 1991 and Mayer, 1990, pp. 1-11. guidance." It's near-zero interest rate policy has affected credit and resource allocation in the course of stimulating both the real estate and stock markets. The law mandated increased transparency through a one-time GAO review of all loans and other transactions related to the Fed's emergency financial assistance during the financial crisis (December. 1, 2007 and July 21, 2010) ; the audit included an evaluation of the 57 For an earlier view on the transmission of unexpected monetary policy effects through changes in stock market values, see Bernanke and Kuttner, 2004. 58 All bank holding companies with assets in excess of $50 billion that are, by the Act's definition, systematically important financial institutions (SIFIs). Factors applied by the FSOC in making such designations include a company's "scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness...." In July, 2012, the FSOC designated eight "financial market utilities" (clearing or settlement systems) as systematically important. In July, 2013, it designated AIG and GE Capital as systematically important nonbank financial institutions. Subject to recommendations by the Council, the Fed is required to impose "enhanced prudential standards" on all SIFIs, including higher capital, leverage and liquidity requirements. SIFIs must also develop "orderly resolution" plans ('living wills') intended to permit their liquidation without systemic impact. The Federal Reserve and FDIC have jointly issued rules for "living wills." If a company does not submit a credible resolution plan, the Federal Reserve may determine that it "poses a grave threat to financial stability." On a two-thirds vote of the FSOC, it can restrict mergers, acquisitions, involvement with specific financial products, and require it to sell assets. In the case of a failed banking company, the FDIC can take the company into receivership so that it continues to function until sold.
effectiveness of the policies, and was completed in 2011. 59 Periodic GAO audits, however, continue to exclude monetary policy and related areas. 
V. DISCUSSION
Review of Federal Reserve governance reveals the role of the System's original "checks-andbalances/clash-of-interest" design, the necessity for its early deconstruction, and the subsequent reorganization that shifted authority to the Board, obliging all policy-makers to focus on what Eccles termed "a broad social point of view" rather than parochial interests. These changes notwithstanding, much of the original System architecture has been retained, including continued member-bank ownership of twelve Reserve Banks, and legal language that specifies diversified economic and regional interests for policy-making officials.
The original internal governance mechanism was a crucial factor in Congress's intention to insulate the Federal Reserve from politics. Since the mechanism was crippled by System objectives that required centralization and coordination, Congress has struggled, with modest success at best, to establish an external substitute that would not interfere with the Federal
Reserve's independence in formulating and implementing monetary policy.
59 GAO, 2011. 60 Board of Governors, 1984. Reorganization in the 1930s nested principal authority with Federal Reserve Bank, 34 F.2d 910, 915 (2d Cir. 1929) . About 50 years later, a claim arising out of the Franklin National Bank failure was similarly decided: "(it) would be an unthinkable burden upon any banking system if... [Federal Reserve's policies] were to be subject to judicial review. Indeed, the correction of discount rates by judicial decree seems almost grotesque,..." Huntington Towers, Ltd. v. Franklin National Bank, 559 F.2d 863, 868 (2d Cir. 1978 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Federal Reserve governance was, at its origin, principally instituted through a fragmented system that provided an internal set of checks and balances. The original arrangement eroded in the 1920s with policies aimed at smoothing out the business cycle. Governance was left to congressional oversight, limited by the general view that monetary policy should be insulated from politics
Reorganization of the Federal Reserve in 1935 shifted authority from the Reserve Banks to the Board and codified the change from a fragmented system to a centralized organization.
Congress, in the 1970s made an effort to assert its constitutional prerogative to both monitor and alter Federal Reserve policy, but its influence has been limited.
With the dissolution of internal governance and limited external governance, the inexorable expansion of the Federal Reserve's power and influence, largely in periods of economic distress, has intensified the need for effective governance. The absence of adequate mechanisms remains a threat, not only to those affected by monetary policy, but to the independence of the Federal Reserve itself.
